Thomas J. Laub's Holocaust Presentation at Millersville University

"The German Army in France, 1940-1942"
by
Thomas J. Laub

University of Virginia, Charlottesville

In a letter dated 25 July 1944, Gauleiter Martin Mutschmann asked Heinrich Himmler why there were any Jews left in France. He warned his superior that "as long as Jews still live in Europe, partisans, criminals and saboteurs will always menace our leaders and disrupt our lines of supply." In his response, Himmler attributed the problem to "very precarious relationships" with the "extremely difficult" military commander in France.(1) Himmler's reply may have been a simple explanation sent to a junior official, but the original question remains important to historians studying the Holocaust. The story of the Final Solution in France cannot be characterized as a struggle between the good Wehrmacht and evil SS. German soldiers executed French civilians in response to assassinations carried out by resistance groups, and a disproportionate number of Jews and communists can be found among the victims. A survey of military records suggests Army officers viewed Jews with considerable suspicion but displayed an attitude that fell short of eliminationist anti-Semitism articulated by leading SS officials or described in Daniel Goldhagen's Hitler's Willing Executioners.
Before the spring of 1940, German leaders devoted little thought to the structure of a government that would control France after the conclusion of military operations. Rudimentary plans developed during the winter of 1939/1940 proved woefully inadequate. General Otto von Stülpnagel, the Militärbefehlshaber or military commander of France, and his counterpart in Belgium both requested additional personnel to govern territory under their respective commands.(2) As per standard German military procedure, both commanders prepared a system of hostages to guarantee the safety of occupation forces. They made local officials, dignitaries, and businessmen personally responsible for attacks against German soldiers or civilians. Jews and communists figured prominently on lists of potential hostages. Nazi officials and military commanders assumed Jews and communists to be implacable enemies of the Third Reich and, unless proven otherwise, responsible for attacks against the military government. In general, the military government designed hostage measures to deter resistance activities -- activities equivalent to terrorism in the eyes of the German authorities. Since both civilian and military leaders assumed Jews instigated many acts of resistance, sanctions and executions fell largely on the shoulders of Jews and people linked to the French Communist Party.
General Otto von Stülpnagel believed Jews were behind many acts of resistance but opposed measures designed to eliminate Jews from French society. In an order dated 17 September 1940, Hitler directed the Einsatz Rosenberg, a small independent agency controlled by Nazi theoretician Alfred Rosenberg, to confiscate valuable art work owned by French Jews.(3) Three weeks later Reichsmarschall Göring seized the initiative and instructed the civil branch of the military government to assist the Einsatz Rosenberg, confiscate art owned by prominent French Jews, and transport masterpieces to the Louvre in Paris. Confiscated treasures would then be divided between Hitler, Reichsmarschal Göring, Reichsleiter Rosenberg, and various museums throughout the Reich. To soften the blow, Göring proposed unclaimed works of art be auctioned off and the proceeds disbursed among French veterans by the French government.(4)
The French government immediately protested German expropriations in formal notes dated 21 October and 18 December 1940. The measures had little support among the French public and undermined popular support for the Vichy regime. But the popularity of Vichy did not concern Hitler even though discussions with Marshal Pétain at Montoire seemed promising. Ambassador Otto Abetz simply ignored French protests. To quell public opposition to German expropriations, Vichy later promised additional public relief during the upcoming winter.(5)
Seeing a myriad of problems, Stülpnagel also protested orders from Hitler and Göring in letters to Field Marshal von Brauchitsch. The Militärbefehlshaber thought confiscations would "undermine respect for the State and leaders of the Reich in eyes of the German public and in the judgement of the world."(6) Stülpnagel based his opposition on sections of the Hague Convention and Armistice Agreement that protected private property. OKW countered that Jews were enemies of the Reich and thus subject to provisions allowing the confiscation of enemy property.(7) Second, the Militärbefehlshaber described anti-Semitic policies as social measures far outside the domain of military interests. Leaders in Berlin rejected this argument on pragmatic grounds; only the army had the resources to assist the Einsatz Rosenberg. Stülpnagel urged his superiors to grant the Einsatz Rosenberg sole responsibility for the entire debacle and participated only with the greatest reluctance. While mired in delicate negotiations with the Vichy government, the Militärbefehlshaber had to cope with punitive ideological directives coming from Berlin. In the end, General von Stülpnagel made powerful enemies and lost the battle. He had to obey Göring's directive and help the Einsatz Rosenberg
Conflict between Stülpnagel, Göring, and the Einsatz Rosenberg continued through the winter of 1940. In many ways it can be seen as the first round in a longer struggle between generals in Paris and politicians in Berlin. Later disagreements revolved around the German hostage policy or how Germans should respond to attacks against military personnel. Official German documents refer to the debate as the Geiselfrage or hostage question.
Dr. Werner Best wrote guidelines outlining German hostage policy during the winter of 1940/41 while serving as head of the civil branch of the military government. As a native of the Rhineland, Best had little love for French authorities who had arrested him twice during the French Occupation. During the first months of the war Best commanded an Einsatzgruppen in Poland and, after 1942, served with notoriety as the civil governor of Denmark.(8) His hostage policy outlined a variety of measures that regional, departmental, and district commanders could use to discourage sabotage and described appropriate responses to terrorist attacks. Best himself later described the policy as an attempt to create a uniform process through which all German responses to terrorist attacks could be formulated.(9)
Communal responsibility served as the basis for Dr. Best's guidelines. He did not hesitate to punish an entire community for individual crimes unless perpetrators acted alone and without the knowledge of the local population. But the burden of proof rested upon local officials. Best's guidelines included a variety of non-lethal responses to terrorism or opposition to the occupation authorities. He recommended curfews, travel restrictions, fines, and the prohibition of alcohol as appropriate responses for crimes such as the cutting of telegraph cables or passive resistance.(10)
Ultimately hostages remained at the heart of the German efforts to suppress the Resistance. Best's guidelines directed regional commanders to assemble lists of people with ties to the three main resistance groups: former members of the Communist Party, nationalists sympathetic to Charles de Gaulle, and known anglophiles. If authorities failed to apprehend individuals responsible for a serious crime against occupiers, guidelines directed local officials to retaliate by submitting a list of potential victims to General von Stülpnagel. After the Militärbefehlshaber and Berlin approved the German response, regional commanders could then execute hostages. In order to be effective, Best emphasized that both the general policy and specific list of hostages had to be widely publicized. He suggested that they be used as a last resort when other sanctions paled in comparison with the original crime. Although the civil government developed hostage measures in March of 1941, only the deliberate attack against Naval Cadet Moser in August 1941 triggered their implementation.(11)
As a Lieutenant-colonel in the SS, Best commanded the civil branch of the German military government and was subordinate to Stülpnagel. His hostage policy represented the traditional approach of the German military to the problem of governing hostile occupied territories. Yet his background in the SS suggests a strong familiarity with Nazi racial doctrine and, considering his service with an Einsatzgruppen in Poland, a willingness to translate Hitler's anti-Semitism into action. As a subordinate of Stülpnagel, a product of the Imperial Army and wedded to traditional military values, Best could never hope to decisively resolve the Jewish question. An opportunity to escape the shackles of the traditional general came in October 1941.
After the assassination of Naval Cadet Alfons Moser on 22 August 1941, German officials informed the French government of their hostage policy and publicized measures through a series of radio announcements, newspaper articles, and posters. But the policy failed to stop additional attacks. On September 3 a resistance group assassinated a second German officer and, three days later, the military government executed three hostages.(12) Violence and counter violence began to spiral out of control, raising serious concerns among leaders in Paris, Vichy, and Berlin.
Hitler personally intervened on 16 September 1941. Through the offices of General Keitel and the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Hitler ordered his commanders use "the sharpest measures" against the Resistance. He declared human life to be of little value in occupied countries. The directive explained that "only the death penalty can be a real means of deterrence" and suggested that 50 or a 100 hostages be executed for each German soldier killed by resistance movements. The Führerbefehl specifically rejected mild punishments that increased with the severity of the crime.(13) Much to the chagrin of authorities in Berlin, Stülpnagel ignored the order and, after the death of Captain Sheben on the night of September 19, executed only 12 hostages.
The Militärbefehlshaber opposed the 16 September Führerbefehl as he did the confiscation of artworks owned by Jews, but again his opposition proved short-lived. Resistance agents assassinated Lieutenant-colonel Hotz, the Feldkommandant of Nantes, on the morning of October 20, 1941. Hitler heard of the attack and, on the same day, issued a direct order to General von Stülpnagel through the offices of Field Marshal Keitel. The Führer commanded the immediate execution of 50 hostages, imposed a million franc fine, and ordered the execution of additional hostages if German or French authorities failed to catch the perpetrators. Later that same day, Vichy Interior Minister Pucheau reported that English paratroopers carried out the attack. Stülpnagel passed the news along to General von Brauchitsch in Fontainbleau and General Wagner in Berlin but to no avail. Following Hitler's order, soldiers executed the first group of 50 Frenchmen on the 21st of October.(14)
Late on the night of October 23rd, the Militärbefehlshaber again discussed the entire situation with General Wagner, the Chief Quartermaster of the German Army General Staff. He used pragmatic considerations to oppose measures ordered by Hitler. Stülpnagel insisted small groups of communists and nationalists attacked German authorities with assistance from English paratroopers. German sanctions punished the wrong people. Second, he argued that additional reprisals would embitter large sections of the French public, undermine popular support for the Vichy regime, and endanger political collaboration between Vichy and Berlin. The Militärbefehlshaber further explained that continued use of what he called "Polish Methods" would force the government to intern all men between the 16 and 60 years of age and ruin German efforts to tap French resources. Stülpnagel concluded his conversation with a plea for a clear explanation of the goals and principles behind German occupational policies. News of his opposition to the Führerbefehl quickly spread throughout Berlin.(15)
Less than three weeks later, Joseph Goebbels cited Stülpnagel's policy of gradual deterrence and gentle sanctions as misguided and mistaken. In a conference with General Alexander von Falkenhausen on 13 November 1941, the Minister of Propaganda reiterated the need for strong measures to suppress resistance, even if innocent civilians perished as a result of German sanctions. To further support his case, Goebbels suggested that shortages of both Gestapo and Geheim Feldpolizei compelled German authorities to pursue -- in his words -- an "Ostaktion." Like his Führer, the Minister of Propaganda clearly believed that resistance forces could be cowed into submission through the ruthless application of force. Notes from the conference leave no doubt that pressure for radical hostage polices emanated from Berlin and that Nazi authorities would not tolerate resistance to their directives. General von Falkenhausen left with the impression that his colleague's days were clearly numbered.(16)
Hitler recognized the depth of military opposition to his policies and issued a second decree governing German responses to resistance attacks. Keitel's introduction to this second mandate, later dubbed the Night and Mist decree, read as follows:

It is the long considered will of the Führer that, in the occupied zone, attacks against the Reich or occupying power should be met with other measures. In the eyes of Hitler, punishing crimes with prison sentences, even lifelong prison sentences, is a sign of weakness. An effective and enduring deterrence can only be had through death sentences and equally far-reaching measures, measures that leave the relatives and public uncertain over the fate of the perpetrator. Deportation to Germany also serves this purpose. The attached guidelines for the persecution of criminal offenses correspond to the view of the Führer. They have been examined and approved by him. Signed Keitel.(17)

This second Führerbefehl provided an escape clause for traditional military commanders like Stülpnagel and Falkenhausen. Rather than execute hostages directly, military leaders could turn hostages over to the SS for deportation to a German concentration camp. Speaking for OKW, Admiral Canaris later added that these measures only applied to military commanders stationed in Western Europe.(18) SS leaders had already worked out another arrangement with Wehrmacht commanders in charge of the Eastern Front without intervention from Hitler.
These changes satisfied neither Hitler nor Stülpnagel. Despite the escape clause in Hitler's second decree, the Militärbefehlshaber believed he had lost the confidence of Hitler and his superiors. In a bitter letter dated 25 February 1942, Stülpnagel cited ill health and asked to be replaced. His letter of resignation continued to justify a policy of proportional sanctions and opposed mass executions. Hitler accepted the general's resignation and named General Karl von Stülpnagel, the cousin of the original Militärbefehlshaber, as his replacement. To forestall additional opposition from the Wehrmacht, Hitler stripped the military of control over German police and appointed SS General Karl Oberg chief of SS and German police forces in France. Oberg controlled all German, and by extension French, police forces operating in the Hexagon.
Nazi authorities circumvented military opposition to what Stülpnagel referred to as Polish methods by removing conservative officers from the decision-making process and appointing a chief of SS and police forces in France. This tactic allowed the SS to initiate a campaign against Jews and communists unfettered by traditional or conservative officers. Yet the victory came at a cost. After it assumed sole control of German anti-Jewish policies, the SS could not draw upon abundant military resources scattered throughout the Hexagon. Without assistance of the German army, SS leaders did not have enough personnel to locate, arrest, and deport all the 330,000 Jews living in France. Oberg and his subordinate first used French police as auxiliaries to round up Jews in major French cities. This tactic proved fruitful until the fortunes of war turned against Germany, opposition to anti-Semitic legislation took root in French society, and active collaboration became unpopular. French support for anti-Semitic policies faded during the final years of the War. By 1944 the SS could only rely on small groups of Milice to help carry out the Final Solution.
Serge Klarsfeld, a French lawyer and leading authority on the Holocaust in France, estimates that 330,000 Jews lived in France at the end of 1940. Approximately 80,000 Jews or 24% of the Jewish population living in France eventually perished in German concentration camps during the second World War.(19) In contrast, 105,000 of 140,000 or 75% of Jews living in the Holland perished in Nazi death camps.(20) These numbers are, in light of the political and administrative chaos that gripped Western Europe, estimates. But they indicate that a substantial number of Jews who lived in France during 1940 managed to survive the war. This brings us back to the question raised by Gauleiter Mutschmann at the beginning of this discussion. How did so many Jews who lived in France survive the war?
Raul Hillberg, Robert Paxton, François Bédarida, and other historians argue that a shortage of manpower undermined German efforts to exterminate all Jews living in France. During the War the SS never controlled more than three brigades or 3,000 Ordnungspolizei. This small contingent eventually arrested less than 5% of the 330,000 Jews during the Occupation. French police caught most of the 80,000 Jews who later perished on German concentration camps. But the Wehrmacht had plenty of soldiers stationed in France throughout the war. In August 1940 the Oberkommando des Heeres posted 105 Landesschützen battalions in the Occupied Zone. The number of battalions declined to 60 by May 1942, but they still represented a paper strength in excess of 75,000 soldiers.(21) In addition, the army stationed dozens of regular and SS divisions throughout France while they absorbed new troops.
Oberg and the SS may have not have had enough agents to carry out their assigned tasks, but the same restrictions did not limit the Wehrmacht. Between the Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich and General von Rundstedt, the commander of regular divisions protecting France from an Allied invasion, German authorities had more than enough troops to crush small resistance bands, guard against Allied commando raids, and guarantee order throughout France. But neither general allowed units under their control to participate in the Final Solution or massive anti-Semitic measures. The origins of their refusal can be found in political competition that unfolded between 1940 and 1942. Inter-agency struggles ended in a draw with no single rival gaining control of German policy, but this in itself represented a major political defeat for the Wehrmacht.
When the occupation began in the summer of 1940, the Militärbefehlshaber controlled all military and police forces stationed in France. Shortly after the Pétain and Hitler talked at Montoire in October 1940, the military lost control of foreign policy and it's struggle with the Einsatz Rosenberg. Ambassador Abetz and the Paris embassy replaced the Armistice Commission as the primary diplomatic conduit between the German and French governments.(22) In response to Stülpnagel's opposition to his hostage policy, Hitler stripped the Militärbefehlshaber of control over the German police. Special commissars like Fritz Sauckel further undermined the military government by upsetting previous agreements and removing sections of German policy from military control. Some Wehrmacht officers stationed in Paris detested Hitler's ideological directives and later supported the 20 July 1944 plot against Hitler by placing all SS officers in Paris under house arrest.
Conservative elements in the army opposed radical social policies ordered by Berlin. General Otto von Stülpnagel fought any program that would tarnish the reputation of Germany or the armed forces. Wehrmacht guidelines tried to discourage resistance movements and restore the French economy so that the latter could contribute to the German war machine. Ambassador Abetz had a very different agenda of political revolution. He wanted to install a French government sympathetic to the goals of national-socialism, even if this destabilized France and led to internal unrest. The SS had few political or economic interests in France, but Himmler's subordinates consistently advanced a radical social agenda designed to purge the French state of Jews, communists, and other hostile influences. All three groups frequently worked at cross-purposes and could not agree on a coherent agenda. Political rivalry undermined German policy at every turn.
Internal disagreements among German organizations mitigated the Holocaust in France. Even though General von Stülpnagel suspected Jews were behind most acts of resistance, he retained a traditional moral code that did not allow him to endorse mass executions of innocent civilians. SS ambitions aggravated moral concerns of military commanders. When Hitler transferred all police forces to the SS and appointed Oberg chief of SS and police forces in the spring of 1942, he stripped the military government of the basic tool it needed to govern France. To add insult to injury, the SS gained control of military police serving in Western Europe. Wehrmacht officers accepted defeat with passive resistance. They did not support the Final Solution and opposed SS programs whenever possible. While the Wehrmacht retaliated against Jews and communists when the Resistance killed German soldiers, they stopped short of helping Oberg carry out the Final Solution. Some moved beyond passive resistance to outright opposition by supporting the 20 July 1944 plot against Hitler. Internal rivalry among German agencies limited Hitler's efforts to eliminate Jews living in France and suggests that some officers did not share Hitler's radical anti-Semitism.
Endnotes:
1) T-175/155/2685770-4
2) Lucien Steinberg Les Allemands en France, 1940-1944 pp. 21-23
3) Michael Marrus and Robert O. Paxton Vichy France and the Jews pp. 79-80
4) T-77/1624/6-7; G�ring order dated 3.11.40 T-77/1624/11.
5) T-77/1624/8
6) T-501/165/339-40.
7) T-501/165/344-6.
8) Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France & the Jews p. 78; Steinberg, Les Allemands pp. 32-3.
9) Steinberg Les Allemands pp. 32-3; T-501/165/395
10) T-501/166/71-82.
11) T-501/166/71-82, 95-6
12) T-77/1624/49-52
13) T-501/97/368-71
14) T-77/1624/49-52.
15) T-77/1624/55-7
16) T-501/97/383-92
17) T-77/97/409
18) T-77/97/415-6
19) Serge Klarsfeld Vichy-Auschwitz, pp. 179-80
20) Yahil, The Holocaust p. 574.
21) Lagerbericht der MBF August 1940, T-501/143/339; Lagerbericht der MBF April/May 1942, T-501/144/67.
22) Robert O. Paxton Parades and Politics at Vichy pp. 253-5